By Rostislav Ishchenko
Translated by Ollie Richardson and Angelina Siard
cross posted with http://www.stalkerzone.org/rostislav-ishchenko-the-west-will-learn-about-its-future-in-russia/
source: https://ukraina.ru/opinion/20180830/1020951765.html
At the end of August in Vilnius, Lithuania, the future “Russia without Vladimir Putin” and the “democratisation of Russia” were discussed during the private part of the Conference of the president Valdas Adamkus…
Owing to a combination of circumstances, shortly before this, in the first half of August, an attempt was made to invite me to an economic forum in Krynica-Zdrój (Poland) – which at the time of writing will have just started – and also to a panel during which it was planned to discuss “Russia after Putin”. I wasn’t able to go there because I was busy, but apparently in Krynica-Zdrój the discussion had to be public, so (if they don’t change their mind) soon we will be able to learn about the assessment of leading western experts concerning the prospects of “Russia without Putin”.
Two shells in one crater?
I can say already now that the range of opinions will be extremely wide. Some will forecast liberal restoration, some will forecast fierce competition between “diadochi” (his successors) that will provoke a crisis of statehood, and others will declare that nothing will actually change. However, the essence of this invariance will be perceived by everyone in different ways.
As far as I understand, for the orderers of these brain storms it’s not so much the opinions that are important as their motivation (justification of positions). It is precisely the system of logical proof supporting a certain version of events that allows to estimate from outside its high or low probability.
Like how two shells don’t land in the same crater, the coincidence of the topic of both forums, the interval between which is three weeks, can’t be just incidental. Especially since both events take place in countries of Eastern Europe possessing an expert community that traditionally is quite well versed in Russian affairs and has close connections with Russia’s expert community. A combination of private and public panels allows, on the one hand, to receive an overall picture, and, on the other hand (behind closed doors), to narrow the topics down to concrete ones that the orderer is interested in.
It’s not about Putin
I think that the main issue that worries the western partners of Russia lies not in how and to who exactly Vladimir Putin will ensure a transfer of power after his fourth term, and whether he will stay in Russian politics after this. These questions have an unambiguous answer. After 18 years of becoming acquainted with Putin’s political style, even the most bang average expert of the most backwards Western country must understand that handing over power will happen in clear compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and a person who is capable of supporting and developing the current course will become his successor. And Putin will surely remain in Russian politics, because even as an individual, thanks to his authority, will ensure for his successor the necessary loyalty of the team.
It is precisely this problem – the problem of a team – that interests the West much more than the “Vladimir Putin problem”.
Transformation of the team is already ongoing
Experts know very well that the team assembled under one president rarely unconditionally accept a new president, especially one from their own environment. The person who assembled the team is the leader for them, and the successor is perceived as an upstart. Each of the strong players considers that they could be in this position.
Elections, more often than not, don’t stop the race for power. As a result, the state apparatus breaks up into separate parts (loyal to various political clans), and the administrative function is reduced, gradually transforming into a function controlling the internal conflict destabilising the country.
The West would be interested in a succession of events in Russia along the lines of the worst scenario. They perfectly understand that it is impossible to break Russia in its current condition. The only theoretical vulnerability of Putin’s system of power is the process of its transfer.
The acting system still hasn’t passed through the fully-fledged transfer of governing powers. After the second term Putin not only remained in active politics, but he was also in the second most important position in the country, i.e., the team continued to play with the same leader.
But now it is about the gradual process of transforming the entire team.
The period of transformation is critical for any (not only political) system. It is the most vulnerable during this period. This is the best moment to land a blow. Moreover, the West also perfectly understand that if Putin’s system will painlessly pass through the transformation period too, then a highly reliable mechanism for preserving the political course during a transition of Russian leaders and political teams will be created. The system will pupate and become invulnerable to external influence.
Destabilisation under any slogans
I will once again emphasise that the West knows that they can’t win against Russia. The only chance they have is to blow up the country from within. This chance will arise only if intra-elite contradictions become aggravated, and nothing aggravates contradictions as much as a race for power does.
In order to assist in the emergence of such a fight, the West needs to understand which people are the most probable candidates for entry into the team being transformed, what the timeframe of the transformation is, and what the technology of ensuring continuity will be. By possessing this knowledge it is possible to look for vulnerabilities, collect compromising evidence, kindle contradictions, and stimulate the emergence of personal conflicts.
It is considered that the West is afraid of the coming to power in Russia of so-called “parties of silovik“, which, as is expected, will pursue a firm and aggressive foreign policy.
In reality, this not only doesn’t frighten the West, but, under certain conditions, it can even promote such outcome. Any distortion of the system, the emergence of an open fight, and a rigid standoff between political clans is essentially important for the West. And whether or not Russia will be destabilised under comprador or under patriotic slogans is, by and large, all the same for West. It’s not a coincidence that after the definitive failure of the liberal comprador opposition, the West started supporting the left-wing and radical patriotic opposition in Russia. Here the keyword is opposition, and its colouring is a minor matter.
To find a weak spot
Any, even the most externally powerful state in practice represents an extremely fragile organism. We saw in the examples of the Russian Empire, the USSR, and Ukraine how the power that yesterday seemed to be unshakeable dissolved in a matter of hours. Soros and Clinton’s democrats nearly led to victory the coup started by them in the US that was designed not to allow Trump to win. Only the danger of a civil armed conflict stopped them in the winter of 2016-17 and forced them to temporarily retreat. And now, after the activisation of the new campaign to discredit the president, which is capable of giving the grounds for impeachment, Trump frightens his opponents with the armed resistance of his supporters. I.e., the mighty US is in such a condition that the threat of civil war became the most widely used political argument.
Any system has critical vulnerability. If to find it and strike a blow, then the state collapses before the eyes of amazed citizens who weren’t expecting such things. If the blow hits this vulnerability incidentally, without being specially prepared, then disintegration can be stopped if the leadership gives an effective and proper response. If the blow on the most painful point is struck intentionally and is well prepared, then the chances of remaining intact are zero. The West looks all over Russia’s body for this critical vulnerability and, obviously, connects it to the transformation process that the governing team in Moscow is going through.
The future depends on Moscow
We don’t know how exactly the Russian authorities will solve this problem. We will learn about it only when it has already been solved. But the fact that this solution has to be found and realised already now, before our eyes, doesn’t raise doubts.
There is never too much time to prepare for such responsible events defining the destiny of the country – usually there isn’t enough time. And the suddenly erupting interest of the West in a “Russia without Putin” means that some information about the transformational processes that started there has already been received, and now politicians (of course, not Polish or Lithuanian ones, but those who actually influence the determination of the world’s destiny) try to concretise the situation, anticipate the actions of the Russian authorities, and find that critically vulnerable point that, if struck, will ensure that the country won’t be able to recover. This is the main task of all brain storms that are being organised and will again be organised in the most different places (from the US and Western Europe to Eastern Europe and the CIS).
The following is important: analysing Russia’s domestic policy, the West tries to foresee its own future, since it completely depends on this or that succession of events in Moscow.
This is a critically important issue–the transfer of power post-Putin and the transformation of Russia during the coming six years of Putin.
As the perceptive can determine, Russia in the short term is far more influential than China. The US is terrified that Putin has out-maneuvered them in the Middle East, in the natural gas wars, in the petroleum sector, in the escape for nations from the dollar regime, and in weapons technology development and subsequent sales to what the West thought were allies (Turkey and India and Egypt and Pakistan).
Thus, preventing the aims of Putin and Russia post-Putin is imperative to the Hegemon.
What I believe may happen is the Vertical Power structure, as Ishchenko points out, of the ex-KGB/FSB and several military men, like Shoigu will not hand over power to a pure civilian. They will, with Putin, choose from their group, someone of the same background and decades of unquestioned identical thinking. Someone of the same skillsets. Someone who they, even as emeritus advisers, as Putin certainly will be, can team with another several decades.
Russia was saved by Putin and the Security and Military sectors. They are all of the same age, unfortunately, but they are all capable of another ten to twenty years of crystal clear thinking. They understand the tricks and traps of the enemies of Russia. And they are devoted to securing Russia from all internal and external enemies, while solving its social and economic ills.
If it is a next generation choice, it likely could be Patruschev’s son, now 42. He would be 48-49 by then. That gives 46+ years of the closest relationship with Putin through the Patruschev line. Perhaps, it might have been Sergei Ivanov’s son, who tragically drowned several years ago and altered his father’s ascendance. Another 40 year relationship with Putin. Whoever it is, I believe it has to be from the Silovik.
Whatever, I think the person has to pass approval of all the men who put Putin in power and who have served him and the nation through the resurrection from the near-death left by Yeltsen in 1999 to the magnificence of its military and the beauty of the World Cup stadia and Kerch Bridge and jets and missiles and S-400 and EW systems.
There won’t be any harm to the process of succession. These men are masters of surprise and security.
For the West, it will be seen as a failed opportunity (they never had). How they will deal with it will be how they deal with Putin and Russia now. With phobia and malice.
The real question is what will follow Trump, May, Merkel and Macron? What mediocrity could rise from the Swamps of the hegemon?
I think also, a legal exception could be constructed (it was brought up post the Russian election) for Putin to stay for life. If the economy is growing and security is stable for Russia, the Constitution could be easily changed and the Tsar would be official.
I don’t see much objection to “Putin for life”. Why would you discard your best man just because a man-made document has some arbitrary timescales? I can’t see the people of Russia objecting either. And Putin looks very fit mentally and physically.
Nonetheless, it remains the duty of any leader to ensure the succession.
Knowing how Putin thinks is to know what will transpire in the future, post Putin. I’m sure he has several likely candidates, like-minded individuals, whose dedication to the country’s interest are foremost in their minds. I agree with you that the candidate(s) will be thoroughly vetted by Putin, Shoigu and other honorable, patriotic individuals, looking to continue Russia’s rise to greater economic, prosperous, trade and culture scenarios with the rest of the world. I know many of them would prefer Putin stay in office for life, but the man has given much of his life to his country’s interests and may decide he’s done enough. I think, too, it all depends on the state of the world at the time of his intended departure – if Russia is threatened, he will not leave it in dire need of his very capable hands.
“What I believe may happen is the Vertical Power structure, as Ishchenko points out, of the ex-KGB/FSB and several military men, like Shoigu will not hand over power to a pure civilian. They will, with Putin, choose from their group, someone of the same background and decades of unquestioned identical thinking. Someone of the same skillsets. Someone who they, even as emeritus advisers, as Putin certainly will be, can team with another several decades.”
Sounds like a relay race: where the aim is for the number 2/next runner to align with no. 1 runner so that the prize can be handed over without breaking stride, slowing down, or losing any focus or advantage.
Katherine
I agree that it’s important to prepare next generation to take the helm. It is also important to evaluate the “diadoxoi – inheritants) for their thoughts to be free of Western Brainwashing, which all the people are exposed to every day, even in Russia. Of course no one can expect new president to be a shoe-in replacement for Putin. But the person has to be a strong patriot.
Apparently the West will never give up it’s crazy death struggle to dominate or destroy Russia. This obsession will continue, Putin or no Putin. And it is not as if the Russians are not aware of this evil plotting by the US and it’s allies. The game is on and everybody knows it. What we don’t know is how it will end. We can only stay tuned as the unpredictable madness runs it’s course. The death of all humans is definitely a strong possibility.
“Apparently the West will never give up it’s crazy death struggle to dominate or destroy Russia”.
Of course it’s not “the West” in the sense that 99.999% of the citizens of the so-called “Western” nations have nothing to do with such thinking. (Most of them would settle for a secure, decently-paid job and edible food).
The tiny handful of vicious criminals who are prosecuting aggression against Russia (and China and Iran and Venezuela and Argentina and Afghanistan and Iraq and Syria and Yemen…) are very hard for ordinary decent human beings to understand, because their motivation is so alien to us.
They began by spending their lives playing a gigantic game of “Monopoly” with real money and property. That game, as you may recall, usually ends when one person owns all the money and almost all the property. The other players are often quite disgruntled, and in my experience hurt feelings can persist for days.
But just imagine that it’s not a game at all, but played with people’s lives. All the money that the “winners” accumulate, as explained by Michael Hudson (for example), is removed from the economy causing severe “debt deflation” and “rent deflation”. That money, if divided up among ordinary decent people, would make the difference between a wretched bare existance and a happy, comfortable life. The rich and powerful exult in this: the greater the “wealth gap”, the more successful they feel.
When it comes to geopolitics, just imagine that while continuing with their inhuman game of “Monopoly”, the players also take up a game of “Risk”. In that game you accumulate “armies” and use them to conquer the world. It’s really very similar to Monopoly, but with a rather simpler set of rules.
What is not normal is that theses people could, safely and without any risk for themselves, continue playing with countries and people lives. Everything would change if from time to time they get a nice sweet caliber missile over one of their mansions, or just desappear in their private jet in the sky.
You can never win over an enemy who is always safe and secure in keeping trying to detroy you!
First of all, Putin’s influence and legacy are far from “over”. Secondly, the forces inside Russia will fail to liberalize the culture, just as the forces outside Russia will fail to smother it. As long as tradition and cultural memory are a part of Russia, it’s heritage will remain. I see this in the present generation, and it is a heart warming sign of hope that the authors of “social turbulence”, as in the decadent West, will fail.
There is good and evil, beyond the nihilism that is being proffered to create mass populations whose cultural identity is “blended out”, such that they have no cultural pride, without which they more easily bow down to the false gods of debt and the religion of materialism.
There is much to save in this world, and Russia has a great responsibility to save it.
Russian Orthodoxy stands an almighty anchor against the vicissitudes of deranged liberals. Putin clearly understands this. His embrace of traditional religion may or may not be genuine, I hope it is the former, but regardless of Putin’s spiritual convictions it is clear he understands that Orthodox Christianity steels the Russian people against those who would destroy the social fabric of Russian culture and identity. A people united under Christ will always stand tall against those who would cause them harm.
Premature to discuss Putin´s position as he have 6 years left until 2024. Can anyone predict just 1 years geo-political development ahead today???
You are absolutely right, 6 years is a long period, especially in ever changing world we live in.
Focus should be more on an event of Putin’s sudden death or being assassinated (God forbid), before finishing this term. I would say, his successor is already decided, based on the possibility of one of these 2 tragic events.
Aggressive strategy of the West toward Russia that will continue ( sanctions, global issues, Ukraine, North Caucasus , Baltic , Poland , Balkans ) may well forced Russia to introduce, as a response, war-like measures and Putin will stay for much longer then expected . Or someone even tougher then Putin ? Rules in the war are different then rules in the peace .
Russian neoliberals declared their “zastoi”.
The pension reform in Russia is sinking the Government, led by a prime minister whose confidence in the population is already very low, less than 8% in August. Unable to assume the political charge of this globalist reform, which is part of the logic of the OECD, carried out in parallel in Germany, brought to Russia by the neoliberal clan, President Vladimir Putin had to leave yesterday on the screens. He can not save the reform, but he can impose it. The neoliberals make him pay the price of popular support. For everyone to appreciate the merits of these globalist movements, the bias will in any case be ideological. What interests us here more concerns the implications for governance in Russia, during the last term of a leader that will be difficult to replace. It would seem that the West is once again helping these “liberals” to artificially recreate the conditions of the end of the USSR: impression of political stagnation, social disavowal and economic mythology. A cocktail that recalls the “zastoï” (stagnation) of Brezhnev, brought up to date in “zastoi” neoliberal and we were strangely served yesterday especially the channels and all the tone. What’s the point?
The pension reform goes very badly in the opinion. Its necessity is not understood, it was imposed as in the heyday of Gaidar’s shock therapy and was not better accepted than this one. On the merits, as we have already written here, this mechanical reform is used to reduce state expenditure by reducing the time during which the government will pay pensions, some may even say that they will never to take care of it because in view of the average life expectancy, they will have died before. Not to mention the problems caused by late unemployment and the difficulty of finding a job. But these reforms do not concern only Russia, they are supported by the OECD which made it its warhorse. Moreover, yesterday, just like Putin, Angela Merkel announced a similar reform in Germany. The same day, symbolic. These reforms are therefore not dependent on the situations of each country, of each society. They are necessary because ideologically decided. That Russia has another social organization, more traditional, with grandmothers who leave early to take care of grandchildren does not interest anyone. In any case, precisely, this does not correspond to the current dogmas, they must work, take care of them, think about what is important, that is to say they. We are at the time of hollow and conquering individualism, certainly not at the level of intergenerational links. It even seems, as we have heard in France, that grandparents can be harmful to children. This reform will therefore “treat” Russian society, if not the budget.
A politico-media operation with dubious results
But beyond the appreciation that we can have of this issue, the need to take out President Putin as an umbrella (or bomb shelter), to protect himself and transfer to him all the political responsibility of this step , is not without political consequences.
Yesterday, the big Bertha medico-political was dusted for the occasion and fired all wood. Already the day before, the official announcement was made: the President will speak to the people. In itself, that the President speaks about a controversial reform, which engages the whole population, it is normal, it is besides its role. But these special announcements cause particular expectations in the population.
The President is on the side of the population, he must understand it, he defends social policy, he can not support this neoliberal reform, which transfers the burden entirely on the population. With Medvedev’s lack of media in recent days, people had excessive hopes: the prime minister will jump, Putin will bury the reform, and so on. Others felt that there could be “only” pensions, there should certainly be important announcements concerning Donbass, South Ossetia, sanctions …
And finally, there was a surprising speech, almost apologetic, justifying the pension reform. Explaining that circumstances have changed, it is time to do so. But with some relaxation, a kind of ni-ni, neither totally neoliberal nor frankly social. Arrangements mainly concerning women, whose retirement age will only be increased by 5 years, the strengthening of social guarantees, the possibility of an administrative or penal sanction in case of unemployment of an individual in pre- retirement … Technical arrangements, plasters on a social haemorrhage.
The reactions in the press were mixed, but the comments of readers particularly acidic. The members of the Government toured the TV sets to continue to explain, and these explanations were distressing – by their vision of society and the future. Or rather the lack of vision, the lack of strategy of this neoliberal clan. And this has been particularly noticed by the experts.
Why was it necessary to “wet” the President? Because it is the only current political figure that inspires confidence, even if this rate is in free fall since the announcement of this reform. Certainly, but was it not possible to do otherwise? The staging created hopes and expectations that were not satisfied, far from it. The night before, anyway, he had already spoken to ministers and cameras on the subject, the three additional details could very well be inserted. There was no need to put him on the front line.
What surprised the most in this speech is this last sentence:
“I ask you to show understanding”
The presidential reaction is almost Freudian. What understanding? If the reform is well founded and good, people understand it very well, they want to live better, as everywhere, there is no Russian exception. If the reform is unfounded, if it will not bring them anything, they feel it very well. And they understood it. Like many analysts. But in the evening, Kudrin declared in front of the cameras of the big national chains to be satisfied by the speech of the President, because finally it does not question at all the design of this reform. At least, that was said. But what must people finally “understand”?
The neoliberal “zastoi”?
The way the reformers justify it shows their complete lack of strategic vision for the country. They react as if demographics will never increase, as if economic growth will be at best zero, as if wages will not increase. In short, as if it were the end, they did not know what to do to improve the situation, so we must make the bread last a little longer by tightening the belt.
Golikova, Deputy Prime Minister, said yesterday on the set of the 60-minute show, that at the end of the Soviet period, there were 2.5 working-age adults for a retiree and they expect 1.2 to end 2019. And then we will be barely 1 to 1. Yet for years, they explain that the birth rate is starting again. There may be a dip of a few years, after the major reforms that this same clan has in fact carried out in the 90s, but then, logically, the rise in the birth rate must change the situation. Unless the birth support policies do not work in reality? They are banking on demographic stagnation, at best.
We have to increase pensions that are too low, that’s true – that’s why we have to delay the retirement age. So, they want to preserve the cupcake, do not think at all that it can grow, and must distribute and save what is left. In other words, they do not consider themselves absolutely capable of pursuing an economic policy that allows a real recovery, have absolutely no confidence in the capacity of the country’s productive force and foresee economic stagnation. And what is the point of all these speeches about the great digital leap that must save the country? These people do not actually live in the real world at all and are absolutely incapable of thinking about it. So to shape it. They can only fantasize about an inhuman, digital, cold and impersonal world. A world where computers would save them from their limits, like a Deus ex machina.
Golikova also explained that to prevent pre-retirement persons from being laid off, an administrative responsibility (a fine of 200,000 rubles or an equivalent of 18 months salary), or even criminal liability, can be implemented. I do not imagine how it will work, what is this logic. Employers can in any case put their employees out just before the age of pre-retirement, which will not change anything and will only advance the problem. Secondly, from the point of view of economic logic, or even simply common sense: an employer can no longer put an employee out, under pain of punishment, even if he commits professional misconduct, even if he is less efficient than another one and that he has to reduce his staff? In case of economic difficulties in the company, what will the employer do? It’s absurd. And as they know very well that this is unrealistic, social peace is bought with a doubling of the monthly payment of aid to the unemployed (from 4900 to 11 200 rubles). So, in any case, the recovery of employment is not planned and the lightened budget charges on one side are reintegrated on the other.
And each of us explain that they have considered everything and found nothing else. They have not “found anything else”, they have recovered international recommendations, which do not take into account the specificities of countries, which are applied in bulk in Germany, will be applied in France, and enter Russia. Regardless of the birth rate in the countries, regardless of the structure of the societies in question, regardless of the sanctions, regardless of the socio-economic organization of the countries, they are the same revenues. The same recipe: increase the age. Point.
Recall that the planned overall increase in the pension amount is 6000 rubles (1000 rubles per year for 6 years), which makes an overall increase of … 80 euros. And all this socio-political crisis is organized for an increase in retirement pensions of … 80 euros? And all the neoliberal clan, Kudrin in the lead, Golikova after, say they want above all to allow an increase in the standard of living of retirees? With 80 euros per month more ???? For the time being, successive governments do not ratify International Labor Organization Convention No. 102, which imposes a minimum pension at 40 per cent of the average wage, which would be an interesting start.
Yet, in 2011, Putin had at the time made another proposal to refinance the Pension Fund. It turns out that after the fall of the Soviet Union, the participation of companies was at a rate of 40% under Yeltsin and the first term of Putin. In the 2000s, various reforms took place in the direction of liberation of companies from all charges, while taxes are already very low. He then fell 29%, then to 20%. But in front of the deficit which was widening, it was raised to 22%. Putin proposed in 2009 to increase it to 26%, which was achieved in 2011 and the deficit of the Fund was resorbed. Without going back to 40%, experts estimate that 34%, pensions are largely insured without harming economic growth and without questioning the social organization of the country. Oddly enough, this option, which is actually ideologically counter-current, was not mentioned this time.
The reappearance of the “two Russia”?
A rather odd impression emerges from this situation, as if the “two Russia” who clashed in the 90s emerged arms, as if the truce ended. The umbrella umbrella was weakening, this is the last mandate, there is some political uncertainty about the future, and the way in which this reform was presented in a loop last night lets pierce both the ideological shock of these two political clans, the inability of the “liberals” to think strategically about the future of a real country and the resistance of a sovereign vision, carried by the population and foreign policy.
Kremlin spokesman Peskov said Putin’s media outlet has nothing to do with falling his rating. One can believe it, because it is not likely that this operation improves it. While the confidence rating in Vladimir Putin’s person was at its peak with the annexation of Crimea, where it bordered 80%, it exhausted the effects of a policy that was in line with the strategic expectations of the population . Since the launch of pension reform, and others of the same kind in recent times, the rating of all political institutions and political figures is in free fall, as shown by the results of the Wciom polling institute. There is a drop in general confidence, a beginning of crisis of legitimacy of domestic politics.
Putin rose from a 49% confidence rate in May to its all-time low, reminiscent of the Bolotnaya era after the 2011 elections, to less than 37% in August. Medvedev, who never had the confidence of the population, was 10% in May to fall even lower and reach 7.9% in August. How can we keep in place a Prime Minister who does not cause any movement of confidence in the population?
Institutions are not spared. The agreement with the presidency’s policy dropped by 25% between May and August, from 79% to 64%, which is huge. The Duma, lower house of Parliament, particularly exposed in the process of neoliberal reforms, also pays with a fall of 16% over the same period, from 47.2% (which is its average usual level) to 31.8 %.
This break between a neoliberal elite that has taken power and popular aspirations is very noticeable in all matters of domestic politics.
Here is the way people appreciate the situation in the country, in blue dotted average, the first digit in red in April 2018, the last in August 2018:
Is there a change in governance mode?
Each political system has its own political logic, its mode of governance, which depends on both internal and external factors. The Russian system and that of the European countries are diametrically opposed. The Russian system is personalized and centered around a personality, the systemic aspects of governance find it difficult to develop in a rather sterile political system, confronted with destructive oppositions, which do not allow to create stable political dynamics. In European countries, with the relative exception of Germany (but Merkel was able to succeed H. Kohl without any problem and his own succession does not involve an existential question for the country), the system of governance is depersonalized, the heads change, the parties succeed one another, without calling into question the profound political and ideological course.
The situations are very different. In the European countries, the political parties do not cover the ideological ruptures of the society, the distinction right / left makes it possible to hide the real stake nation / global, which neutralizes the electoral stakes, with some punctual misses, as in Italy for example or a time in Greece. In Russia, the political fight is more virulent, even if the parties are not particularly involved, the elections have a real stake of national security. The political struggles are also underhand, but the consequences are all the more important as the central issue is the sovereignty of the country, the opposition is not pacified, not seeking an alternative to the political course conducted, but to the sovereignist ideology.
Given these premises, we understand that European countries can lead unpopular policies, defend other interests than those of their people, because the real source of power is elsewhere, the faces change to calm the popular vindicti and each President goes further than the previous one. They are, in a way, political kleenex, one gets a clean one at the beginning of each term. In Russia, unlike today, the source of power is in the popular anointing, which obliges the President to carry out a policy in conformity with the aspirations of the majority of the population, to defend the national interests, unless to wake up the demons of the revolution.
However, whenever we have seen neoliberals hold domestic politics (Surkov and Bolotnaya in 2011, Kirienko today), we come to popular movements of discontent. That of 2011 was emptied by the replacement of Surkov by Volodin (now head of the Duma), which had managed to bring the necessary reforms to normalize the political situation. Today Kirienko plays again with fire, helped by Kudrin in the economic and we always come back to the same point: the people reject these policies. In more than 60 federated entities (out of 82), groups of popular initiaves, some initiated by the PC, have asked for a referendum to be held on this reform they are challenging. This reform is very symbolic, not only because of its ideological dimension, but also because it affects the weakest.
The power in Russia can decide to “Europeanize” its mode of governance, that is to say to govern “against” the people, but in this case it must also depersonalize the power now and make these faces-leaders interchangeable. We come back to the famous parliamentary republic called by Khodorkovsky and Ksénia Sobchak. Which are finally the political counterpart of Kudrin. Only, Russia is not a small European country, it has territorial and social constraints related to the extent of its territory, the distribution of its population, its ethnic diversity, etc; she does not have a European “protector” or American “big brother”.
Power in Russia can not claim two diametrically opposed policies: sovereign on the international level, taking into account the legitimate interests of the country, and globalist on the inside. Otherwise, it must be understood that crowds can have very violent, sudden and often unthinking, instinctive reversals. The trustworthiness of a leader is maintained, especially when he plays the role of the national leader. It is dangerous to squander it, so long before the end of a term.
https://youtu.be/6uCOZUWNmIA
Open the link(french)but stats in Russian
https://russiepolitics.blogspot.com/2018/08/billet-dhumeur-en-retraite-les.html
Why wouldn’t Putin just remove the PM? The crowds would love it. And following that “sacrifice”, a handful of Medvedev’s people in high office.
Putin stepped away from the United Russia party for his election.
He has to maintain a government that is stable. Thus, the pension proposers (United Russia and Dmitri Medvedev) have to pay the price.
October would be a mark to watch. Putin wants action on his domestic development program. If things are stalled by the Liberals, he cannot give them any more time.
Major preparation for a Colour Revolution in Moscow and in majors cities on 09/09.
US embassy,Navalny gang,NGO,Soros money and even a bunch of UkroNazis crossing the border.They will infiltrate the Pension demonstration.
Yes, the West is indeed making plans for the post Putin period. It would just love to bring Russia back to the Yeltsin period, introducing liberal capitalism, and thus opening the country to plundering and break up. Even little Lithuania had discussions on the post Putin period and the introduction of “democracy” to the country, yet at the same time forgetting that more than 25 % of the population of Lithuania has fled thanks to the liberal democracy it has introduced.
The chief problem for the West is that Putin will be in power for almost six years, which is enough time for him to introduce a mechanism which will ensure a smooth transition period and ensure that Russia is not broken up, as almost happened when Yeltsin was in power. Worse for the West, it has huge financial problems, with both the US and EU printing the dollar and euro backed by nothing, not to mention the debt both have. Can the EU and NATO continue to exist for six more years ? We shall see.
I am not surprised that the West is supporting the liberals in Russia, as well as patriotic forces. That is an old political trick, supporting both sides. The Anglo-American elites would just love to see another Bolshevik revolution in Russia, like the one they financed in 1917. Of course this new “revolution” would be introduced under a different name, like the one they introduced in Kiev in 2014. I trust that Russian patriotic forces will not fall for these cheap machinations of the West.
Finally, I think that any Western delusions about the break up of Russia are now just that, delusions. Putin has placed the country on a solid footing and in six years it will be even stronger than it is now. It remains to be seen who will replace Putin, but as the old Russian saying goes, “you cannot rule Russia without God and the Tzar”. The Kremlin is a castle. A castle needs a king. Maybe one should be introduced, as any politician who replaces Putin will not have the charisma and authority which he possesses. I also see that Romanov descendants have started returning to Russia from the West and taking up residence in the Crimea, no doubt symbolically confirming the reunion of Crimea with Russia. Whose idea was this ? Did the Romanov descendants return on their own initiative, or did somebody instruct them what to do ? Is the West anticipating a Romanov restoration ? Well, just to remind the West that there are Romanov descendants born and raised in Russia.
“…now politicians (of course, not Polish or Lithuanian ones, but those who actually influence the determination of the world’s destiny) try to concretise the situation, anticipate the actions of the Russian authorities, and find that critically vulnerable point that, if struck, will ensure that the country won’t be able to recover”.
They do this, of course, in the limited free time they have after their principal task of continually bitching about “Russian aggression” and “Russian interference in the political affairs of other nations”.